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Download Free PDF. Symbolic identities: Understanding the Macedonia name dispute and its implications for EU politics. Charalambos Tsekeris. Nicolas Demertzis. A short summary of this paper. Download Download PDF. Translate PDF. Symbolic identities: Understanding the Macedonia name dispute and its implications for EU politics blogs.
Charalambos Tsekeris and Nicolas Demertzis write that it is now difficult to predict where the process will lead, but the issue gives some insight into the difficulties politicians encounter when attempting to reframe national identities from above.
Obviously, such a proposal contradicts the way in which most citizens in the country perceive themselves, their self-identity and national narratives. Although Zaev eventually did get a positive vote in parliament for constitutional changes in accordance with the Prespa Agreement he reached with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras in June, the future still seems highly unpredictable and uncertain.
It brings to the foreground questions of democracy and representation in the context of a regional integration driven, both inside and outside the EU, by elaborate ad hoc bargains between national and supranational elites trading off stability for legitimacy amongst them while societal aspirations and preferences become crowded out.
The controversial political and constitutional means through which the Prespa Agreement was ratified in Greece and North Macedonia are the immediate extension of periods of upheaval in both countries: in Greece, a period of deep economic crisis that led to the perpetuation of EU-imposed austerity by a govern- ment elected on the exact opposite promise; and in North Macedonia, a period of mounting authoritarianism and corruption under a self-proclaimed pro-Western government that culminated in a popular uprising, constitutional breakdown, and a tightly contested changeover of political power.
The first is the period from its independence in September until , when the country focused on international recognition, which was largely blocked by Greece especially with regards to the EU. The second period started with the signing of the Interim Accord with Greece in , when the EU encouraged cooperation and negotiations, until — This period ended with the change of government in Skopje in May , leading to the Prespa Agreement. In this sense, the Macedonia question made a foreign policy issue the touchstone of domestic ideological and identity contestation.
However, the dynamics of domestic politics dictated a spiral of escalation. Greek Stud. To that end, Macedonia changed its flag and several aspects of its constitution deemed proble- matic by Greece, while Greece recognized FYROM, ended the economic embargo, and pledged to not object to any membership applications by its neighbour to international and regional organizations of which Greece was a member.
A major turnaround, however, was instituted in the earlys when the Greek government of the time aimed to bring Greece closer to the European mainstream. Integration — This coincided with the EU preparing for its eastern enlargement and feeling optimistic about its ability to shape its strategic periphery.
Consequently, the EU was one of the guarantors of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which brought the armed clashes in Macedonia to an end. Under the Thessaloniki agenda, an enlargement promise was extended to the countries of the region in the hope that the prospect of accession would attenuate ethnic and territorial disputes. Concurrently, Macedonia continued its efforts for wider international recognition, which led to nearly two-thirds of the UN General Assembly recognizing it under its constitutional name by This retreat from the hard-line position of the early s had already taken place in practice as Greece and FYR Macedonia were discussing composite names in UN-sanctioned negotiations already since After the economic crisis severely upended the pro-European consensus in Greek society.
The focus of both Athens and Brussels on the economy and debt left very little bandwidth for initiative on this issue. Graan, Counterfeiting the Nation? Anthropology — Clements, K. Chryssogelos, Still Europeanised? This political crisis43 was temporarily resolved in the summer of under EU auspices with the Przino agreement, but protests and uncertainty continued in Ultimately, even though his party won the plurality of votes in the December elections, Gruevski was unable to form a government and the mandate was given to Zoran Zaev, leader of the opposition.
Following a violent storming of the parliament by VMRO-DPMNE supporters in April and increased external pressure in the aftermath by both the EU and notably the US, finally a new government was formed the following month under Zaev who made foreign policy and the resolution of the name issue among his top priorities. Balabanidis ed. Maksimovic, Greece Returns to the Balkans? OpenDemocracy 13 Feb.
While in the end Alexis Tsipras managed to have the agreement ratified, the process by which this was achieved creates a more restrictive framework for how future Greek governments, including the newly elected centre-right govern- ment of Kyriakos Mitsotakis that came to power in July , will conduct their foreign policy in the EU and especially with respect to the Western Balkans.
The Macedonia name issue re-emerged in Greek public debate in January when the government first announced that it had entered a final phase of negotiations with the new government of Zoran Zaev. Its confrontational negotiation led to a controversial referendum, the closing of the banks and the imposition of capital controls in July. Faced with the threat of expulsion from the Eurozone, Tsipras ultimately assented to a new bailout that imposed punishing austerity conditions.
Chatham House ; G. But the main difference was its relationship with official power. In —94 nationalist mobilization was officially sanctioned by the government and all opposition parties; organizationally and materially supported by the over- whelming majority of civil society; and formed part of a global diplomatic strategy that weaponized the Greek diaspora. In , on the other hand, mobilization took place against official power.
In this sense, these demonstrations did not present continuities only with the nation- alism of the s, but also with the populism of the s when on account of the economic crisis mass mobilization was generated against the political system. When the agreement was up for ratification in the Greek parliament in January , ANEL left the government but a number of its MPs split from the party and continued to support Tsipras, some in return for government posts.
Tsipras won a vote of confidence52 and then proceeded to ratify the agreement with the additional support of some indepen- dent centre-left MPs who had voted against him in the vote of confidence while 48 P. Zeri, Ch. Integration In the EU elections in May the populist party Greek Solution surprisingly elected one MEP largely on its strength in Northern Greece and its opposition to the agreement, a feat it also repeated in the parliamentary elections of July when it elected ten MPs.
Most of the popular reaction to the name deal was mopped up in the EU and national elections by the main opposition party, the conservative New Democracy ND , whose leader Kyriakos Mitsotakis had strongly condemned the signing and ratification of the agreement.
But it was the only way for the party to avoid a split, as well as absorb the strong popular opposition and not allow it to spill over into a new wave of anti-system politics as happened with austerity between — Despite his opposition to the signing of the agreement, Mitsotakis was careful to resist calls to promise to abrogate it if elected prime minister, fearing that such a move would isolate Greece from the rest of the EU.
As prime minister since July , he has promised to scrutinize the 53 N. Europeanization used to be a tool through which national foreign policy goals could be more effectively pursued through the common EU framework while salient and often difficult foreign policy issues were depoliticized and removed from the immediate scrutiny of national electorates.
With the EU much less popular than before, alleviating hard-line positions for the sake of aligning Greek foreign policy to European priorities is now a source of heightened contestation. Hill eds, Routledge For a referendum decision to be valid two conditions had to be met: more than half of registered voters to turn up, and more than half of those to vote in favour.
In the end, the insufficient turnout made the referendum inconclusive. With the referendum being consultative, the parliament was always going to have to make, rather than just accept, the final decision. Ultimately the ruling majority ensured enough votes for the start of the parliamentary procedure to amend the constitution, but the process was highly controversial.
Most notably, before the parliamentary procedure was concluded, the eight VMRO MPs who supported the constitutional changes initiated a controversial and much disputed amnesty law, which offered pardon to some of those involved in the mob attack on the parliament in Ultimately the constitutional amendments were adopted in January 62 E.
What the ratification process really meant for the country and its society is perhaps best understood through an analysis of the referendum turnout.
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